2. Analytical Introduction (12)

3.1.2.2 The notion of second intention


a) The notion of intentio

The term intentio comes from 'in-tendere', which signifies to tend towards (something)*. In the psychology of the will, intention designates the act which bears one towards the end, and on which depends the choice of means. In the noetic field, intentionality refers to the tension of the knowing subject towards the known object. In St Thomas, intentio does not signify the intellective act, but rather the product which is produced at the end of expressing itself and rendering present to itself the thing which it knows:

I call intellectual intention that which the intellect conceives in itself of the thing understood.

Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta.
CG 4, 11, n. 3466

The intellective intentio is therefore, on the one hand (ex parte subiecti), the product (concept, proposition, argument) by which the mind reaches the being of the thing; on the other hand (ex parte obiecti), intentio designates the object which is known by the mind. The relation established by the intentio between the knowing subject and the known object constitutes intentionality.


b) Division

The intentio can have for its object something real - and this is ordinarily the case - or it can have something that follows from the act itself of grasping the real; in the first case, the foundation of the intention in reality will be immediate, whereas in the second case it will be mediated:

The reality corresponds to the concept in two ways. First, immediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the idea of a thing existing outside the mind, for instance, a man or a stone. Secondly, mediately, when, namely, something follows the act of the intellect, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that the reality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through the medium of the intellect’s concept of the thing. For instance, the intellect understands animal nature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and consequently it understands that nature as a genus : to this act, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not correspond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus ; and yet there is something that corresponds to the thought that is the foundation of this mental process.
QDP 1, 1, 10m

intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum considerat illud. Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, id est mediante intelligentia rei: verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis aliis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit eam ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res.
QDP 1, 1, 10m

To this twofold relation between intellect in act and things corresponds the distinction between first intention and second intention. First intention is therefore that which considers things in their real being (and therefore called first); whereas second intention is that which reflectively considers what is known of the thing (and therefore called second). Second intention can therefore be defined objectively as the logical relation of reason inherent in what is known of the thing (insofar as such being is different from the being in se of the thing itself); Subjectively, on the other hand, second intentions signify the concepts by which such relations of reason are known (St Thomas distinguishes in this way between nomen primae intentionis and nomen secundae intentionis, vg SN 1, 23, 1, 3, c. John of St Thomas defines the two types of intentions, objectively considered, in his Ars logica, q. 2, art. 2, 291 a 40 - 44: "Illae ergo affectiones seu formalitates, quae conveniunt rei prout in se, vocantur primae intentiones, quae conveniunt rei prout cognita, vocatur secundae" - "Therefore those affections or formalities, which conform to the thing as it is in se, are called first intentions, whereas those which conform to the thing as it is known are called second.")

The following text summarizes well what must be remembered about logical being of reason, also called second intentions:

there are two kinds of beings: beings of reason and real beings. The expression being of reason is applied properly to those notions which reason derives from the objects it considers, for example, the notions of genus, species and the like, which are not found in reality but are a natural result of the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, i.e., being of reason, constitutes the proper subject of logic.
SM 4, lect. 4, n. 574


ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.
SM 4, lect. 4, n. 574