2. Analytical Introduction (11)

3.1.2. The logical being of reason

3.1.2.1. The logical relation of reason

We know that the ens rationis has no other "existence" than being the object of knowledge. There are therefore necessarily relations of reason with foundation in reality, since these pertain to the genus of beings of reason. Let us now consider the diversity of subjects make up the support for such relations of reason, and we'll help ourselves with an example.

i) in the case of the connection between the eye and the colored object it sees, the thing seen, in its extra-mental reality, founds a relation of reason to the seer; the same extra-mental reality, on the other hand, is the subject of said relation of reason.

ii) in the case on the other hand of the relation of attribution between 'polite' and 'Peter' in the proposition, 'Peter is polite', the foundation of the conceptual relation is both in the extra-mental reality constituted by the being polite of Peter; but the subject of that same relation is in the being known of this proposition, in other words the product of the mind. It can also be called remote foundation of the logical relation the reality signified by the product of the mind, whereas this last will be the proximate foundation of it.

From these premises it follows that logic has for its formal object quod (ie for subiectum) the relations of reason between concepts emitted by reason in act, and therefore consecutive to the intellective act itself and its product. In the act itself, for example, in which I know that Peter is polite and in which I express such knowledge saying interiorly 'Peter is polite', I already construct the relation of reason which unites 'polite' and 'Peter'. In the same way, I can say that 'man is a species' because the concept of 'man' is attrubutable to concrete men as a species to its individuals. St Thomas explains it this way:

Now there are certain aspects to which nothing corresponds in the thing understood: but the things thus conceived the mind does not attribute to things as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood: for example, the aspect of genus or species
QDP 7, 6, c.

Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in se ipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt; sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei
QDP 7, 6, c.

In this text we encounter the term intentio, the analysis of which will clarify both logical being and its foundations.