A translation of Fr Alain Contat's Logica

See also PARTICIPATIO

02 October 2008

I. Placement of the Concept (4)

2.3. Divisions

a) by comprehension



1) in function of what is signified

The concept can be either simple or complex

A concept is simple when it signifies only one quiddity, even if this has a very dense comprehension, and therefore could be made explicit in many elements. A concept is also simple when only one essence is expressed in various terms. Vg. 'man', 'equilateral triangle' are simple concepts.

A concept is complex when it signifies more than one quiddity, even if expressed with only one term. Vg. 'blonde man', 'negro' [as in United Negro College Fund].

2) in function of how something is signified

The concept can be either concrete or abstract.

A concept is always abstracted from single existents (or constructed); nevertheless it is called concrete when it implies a subject, even if this remains indetermined. Vg. 'wise', 'white'.

A concept is called abstract in a special way when it signifies only the abstract form, apart from any subject. Vg. 'wisdom', 'whiteness'.

Nota bene: Do not confuse the concrete concept with the individual concept. 'humanity' [in the sense of human essence] is abstract; 'man' is concrete; 'this man' is individual.


b) by extension

1) in function of the way of denoting the individuals to which the concept refers

The concept can be either collective or 'divisive' or distributive

A concept is collective when it exists in a multitude considered as a whole, and not in the same individuals singularly considered. Vg. 'army', 'senate', 'the Roman Curia'.

A concept is 'divisive' or distributive when it exists in a multitude of individuals singularly considered. Vg. 'man', 'soldier', 'senator', 'official of the Roman Curia'.

2) In function of the quantity of individuals denoted

The concept can be either singular or individual, or common, which is in turn divided into either particular or universal.

A concept is singular when its extension is restricted to only one individual determined subject. Vg. 'this man', 'this army'.

A concept is common when its extension is not restricted to only one individual subject. It can then be particular, when it is communicable only to a part of the individuals contained under it, vg. 'some man', 'some army'; or universal, when its extension is not restricted in any way, that is when it is communicable to all the individuals contained in it, vg. 'each man', 'each army'.

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

Hey. Since you are so into logic, perhaps you will like Urraburu:

http://books.google.com/books?id=f-YOAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_summary_r&cad=0

This is the first volume of his 11 (!) volume Institutiones Philosophiae and it treats of logic, and it is massive: well over 1,000 pages.

Enjoy!

Niggardly Phil said...

Thanks for the recommendation. $475 on Amazon for eight volumes, know anywhere I could just get volume 1?

I like the bio on Catholic Encyclopedia.

Niggardly Phil said...

oh, but then I read this:

"Urráburu's work, a lasting monument to the School in general, and particularly to that of Francisco Suárez..."

:(

Anonymous said...

I had the same reaction: Suarez? :(

At any rate, let me know if you find it useful.

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