Chapter One: Placement of the Concept
1. Apprehension, the foundation of the concept
We have seen in the introduction that a line of reasoning can be broken down into judgments, which are resolved in turn to apprehensions. This is thus the simplest act of the mind. For example, if we conceive the notion of 'man', without thinking anything further, the act of grasping what the word 'man' means is nothing other than the apprehension of the notion of man.
We need to clarify three things:
1) The object of apprehension is, generically taken, a certain determined thing, in latin a quid. Formalizing quid, we speak of 'quiddity' (quidditas), which is that which, in the thing, responds to the question, "what is it?" In its being known, such quiddity is actually neither complex nor divisible.
2) Therefore apprehension is not capable of further resolution. In consequence Aristotle calls it the understanding of indivisibles (indivisibilium intelligentia (cf Aristotle, De Anima Γ, 6, 430 a 26-27), which is to say the intellectual intuition of an aspect of reality grasped in an indivisible way. Among the scholastics it is known, with the same meaning, as simple apprehension (simplex apprehensio).
3) The word 'quiddity' has two synonyms, 'essence' and 'nature' which refer to the same reality, but under different aspects. 'Essence', in the generic sense, signifies a certain ontological determination; 'nature' signifies on the other hand the same determination, but insofar as it is an intrinsic principle of operation; 'quiddity' also signifies the same determination, but as a principle of intelligibility, expressible as a definition. 'Essence' therefore has a strictly ontological connotation, 'nature' has a dynamic connotation, 'quiddity' a logico-critical connotation. In this work, we will use these various expressions linked to these diverse connotations (On this theme, cf St Thomas, EE 1, n. 3:
But the term nature used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence because the being has existence through it and in it.
nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse EE 1, n. 3
We now have all the elements needed to understand the definition which St Thomas offers of simple apprehension*:
the intellect, by one of its activities, understands things simply; understanding, for instance, man or ox, or any such thing, simply in itself
SA 3, lect. 11, n. 746
una operationum intellectus est, secundum quod intelligit indivisibilia, puta cum intelligit hominem aut bovem, aut aliquid huiusmodi incomplexorum.
SA 3, lect. 11, n. 746.
It is therefore the operation of the mind by which the intellect grasps a notion in an indivisible way.
* cf also EPA, proem., n.1: One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is
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5 comments:
Hi Phil,
Yesteday you asked over at OC about HTML format for linking, so check this write-up & see if it give you what you're looking for.
That's what I was looking for, thanks very much!
OK, wait a minute. Simple apprehension, right. Quiddity. Right.
Quiddity is neither complex, nor divisible? Just a cotton-pickin' minute!
The essence of man includes (non-signate) matter, as St. Thomas says. The essence of man includes form and content. So how can quiddity not be complex?
Also, man is a rational animal; that is his essence. And yet, "rational" can clearly be divided from "animal." Now, I suppose that "man is a rational animal" is a proposition, and hence we're no longer dealing with simple apprehension. OK. But what about "form-and-matter"? Is that also a proposition, an observation not included in the simple apprehension of the notion "man"?
Will,
Aristotle says in the passage referenced above, chap 6 of 3rd part of De Anima, that 'simple' has two meanings, a) what is not divided and b) what is not divisible.
The quiddity is not complex, ie simple, in the first sense, but not in the second.
In simple apprehension, there is no putting together, for which reason it is simple.
So in apprehending man, he certainly is all of the things you mention, but the mind conceives of 'man' as a simple (not divided) unity.
Another way of saying that is that the quiddity is not a bundle of things gathered in an accidental way. This seems to be a common modern position, interestingly enough.
OK, that works.
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