Analytics Free for All

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (8)

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Let us articulate this Aristotelian structure of the predicables as follows:

One can see that the universal is placed in relation to the species (and not immediately to the individual) under two different aspects, such that there are four possible combinations. Along the line of extension, it can be reciprocable or not reciprocable with the subject; along the line of comprehension, it can be essential or not essential.

Let us return to our initial example. To the concept of 'man' can be attributed the concept of 'rational animal' in a reciprocable and essential way, therefore it is a definition, while one could attribute to the same subject the concept of 'risible' in a reciprocabile but not essential way. As far as the concept of 'animal', it is predicable of 'man' in an essential (determinable) but not reciprocable way, for which it is the genus, while 'white', with respect to man, is neither reciprocable nor essential, and therefore it is an accident. 'Rational', finally, pertains to the essence of 'man', but it is not reciprocable as intellectuality, of which rationality is a modality, because it pertains to other beings (God and seperate substances).

We should now examine briefly each of these predicables (Aristotle, Topics, A, 5, 102a31 - 32).

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (7)

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2. The univocal universal

2.1. The univocal universal in genere

a) Notion

The univocal universal is a concept which is predicable in the same way as each of its inferiors.

b) Division

Let us begin by induction by means of an example. Consider Peter, and let us ask ourselves with regard to him the fundamental philosophical question: 'What is Peter'? I can attribute to him the concept of 'man', or that of 'animal'. In the first case, I attribute to him his own essence, while in the second, I attribute to him only a part of it. I can then attribute predicates to Peter like 'capable of laughing', or 'white'. In the first case, I attribute to him a property which characterizes his nature, while in the second case I attribute to him a quality which pertains to his individuality, but which is unrelated to his human nature. Returning to the level of essence, I can even say 'Peter is rational', attributing to him that part of his essence which differentiates him from animal.

We are now able to deduce the five possible ways in which, according to Porphyry*, a univocal universal can be predicated of a subject:

attributable univocal uiniversal............................predicable
- necessarily
--- signifying the essence
----- totally......................................................species
----- partially
------- determinable part..........................................genus
------- determining part...........................................specific difference
--- not signifying the essence.....................................property
- contingently.....................................................accident

This porphyrian structure of predicables is not immune to platonism, as it only considers things from the perspective of comprehension.

Aristotle had already proposed in his celebrated text of the Topics a deduction of the predicables, more formal insofar as it shows the relations between the universals among one another, more coherent with moderate realism insofar as it considers things not only from the perspective of comprehension, but also that of extension:

For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the definition; if not, it is a property: for this was what a property is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but does not signify the essence. If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms, then it will be the genus or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae; whereas, if it be not one of those terms, clearly it would be an accident, for accident was said' to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition or its genus or a property. Topics A, 8, 103b6-19

* Cf. for example Porphyry, Isagoge 2, 22 - 3, 19. The division is adequate, as St. Thomas notes: CG 1, 32, n. 286:

Omne quod de pluribus univoce praedicatur, vel est genus, vel species, vel differentia, vel accidens aut proprium.

CG 1, 32, n. 286whatever is predicated of many things univocally is either a genus, a species, a difference, an accident, or a property.

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (6)

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1.3. Division of the universal

The same linguistic term (ie the universal in dicendo) can be attributed to various subjects in three diverse ways: univocally, equivocally, analogically. There are three types of universality of names, which St. Thomas explains thusly:

sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter:

[A] quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove.

[B] Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali.

[C] Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur 'analogice praedicari', idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur.
SM 4, lect. 1, n. 535

But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses.

[A] Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them univocally, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox.

[B] Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal.

[C] And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said “to be predicated analogously,” i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.
SM 4, lect. 1, n. 535

Let us explain per partes.

[A] A univocal term signifies one concept, whose meaning is always the same. Cf. De principiis naturae 6, n. 366:

Univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, idest definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino. Utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis.

In the example cited by St. Thomas, the term 'animal' symbolizes only the concept of 'animal', which signifies always and only 'corporeal living sensitive substance'.

[B] An Equivocal term signifies two or more concepts, each of which has its own meaning, different from those of the others. Cf. loc. cit.:

Aequivoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, et secundum diversam rationem: sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine, et non in definitione sive significatione: id enim quod significatur per nomen, est definitio

St. Thomas gives as an example "dog", which can refer to the domestic animal or to the constellation. It should be noted that only the term can be equivocal, not the concept, because the latter always bears a certain unity of signification.

[C] An analogical term signifies one concept, whose meaning is partially one and partially many. For example, the term "life" signifies a concept, that of 'life', whose meaning is one insofar as it refers to a substantial reality endowed with a proper operation, but the meaning itself is many insofar as there are various modes essentially varied of being alive (as a plant, as an animal, as a man, as an angel, as God).

It can be seen that, as concerns the concept, only two (and not three) general modes of predicability are possible: univocity and analogy. We should now examine in detail these two types of conceptual universality.

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (5)

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We should now further distinguish two aspects in the natura ut in anima:

Universal

-Common nature ----> fundamental universal [γ1]

-Predicability ----> formal universal [γ2]

Let us explain per partes.

[γ1] The fundamental universal is the nature itself as presented to the human intellect, and as such abstracted and capable of being attributed to concepts of lesser extension. Cf SM 7. lect. 13, n. 1570:

Sciendum est autem, ad evidentiam huius capituli, quod universale dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo pro ipsa natura, cui intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis: et sic universalia, ut genera et species, substantias rerum significant,

For the clarification of this chapter it must be noted that the term universal can be taken in two senses. First, it can be taken to mean the nature of the thing to which the intellect attributes the aspect of universality, and in this sense universals such as genera and species signify the substances of things inasmuch as they are predicated quidditatively;
SM 7. lect. 13, n. 1570:

Taken in this sense, the universal signifies the essence of the thikng; therefore it conicides with the universal in essendo. It is also called the metaphysical universal, because it corresponds to the ontological foundation of universality. For example, the notion of 'man' considered in its meaning is a metaphysical universal, since it signifies human nature as it is in individual men as well as being predicated of them.

[γ2] The formal universal is the nature as explicitly considered under the aspect of its predicability. Cf loc. cit.:

Alio modo potest accipi universale inquantum est universale, et secundum quod natura praedicta subest intentioni universalitatis: idest secundum quod consideratur animal vel homo, ut unum in multis.

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (4)

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The universal thus has two aspects: on the one hand, the nature which has its origin in single things and which is grasped by the intellect by means of the abstractive process; on the other hand, the intention of universality which the nature follows from and in intellective apprehension*. The nature or essence possesses therefore two ways of being: one singular in the existing reality, and one universal in the knowing intellect. Now intentional identity wouldn't be possible between these two ways if they did not have in common the same nature. Therefore we should add to these two ways of being the nature in itself, which is not a third way of being, but rather what is common to both ways of being, leaving being (in the thing or in the intellect) out of it. Thus we are able to distinguish the so-called "three states of nature"**:

secundum rationem propriam: Natura secundum se [α]
(according to its own definition)

secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo: natura in singularibus [β]
(according as it has being in this or in that)
natura in anima [γ]

[α] The natura secundum se (nature as it is in itself) is the nature considered independently of any existence (whether in the thing or in the soul); therefore it comprehends only the essential components of the essence in question. For example, human nature considered in itself includes only the essential predicates of humanity (being, substance, bodily, living, sensitive, rational), to the exclusion of the individual predicates and of existence.
[β] The natura ut in singularibus (nature as it is in single things) is the nature considered insofar as it exists in the concrete single being, like Peter or Paul. This 'state of nature' includes real existence and excludes intentional existence. Therefore the nature is found in this case in an individual way and not universal.
[γ] The natura ut in anima (nature as it is in the soul) is the nature considered as it exists in the human intelligence which knows abstractively, for example in the notion of "man". This 'state of nature'is an abstraction from the individual predicates and singular existence, like [α], but adds to [α] the intentional way of being proper to it which is universality.

The universal consists only in [γ], since [β] is singular by definition, while [α] neither includes nor exludes predicability***.

* Cf. Sn 1, 19, 5, 1, c: Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adiungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species.

** On this doctrine, cf. EE, 3, nn. 16 - 18; SA 2, lect. 12, n. 378.

*** In this regard, cf. EE 3, n. 18: ?Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturæ sic acceptæ; quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas. Naturæ autem humanæ neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutam considerationem. Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas, inveniretur communitas; et hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quidquid est in eo est individuatum.

EE 3, n. 18
Nevertheless, the nature understood in this way is not a universal notion, because unity and commonality are in the notion of a universal, and neither of these pertains to human nature considered absolutely. For if commonality were in the concept of man, then in whatever humanity were found, there would be found commonality, and this is false, because no commonality is found in Socrates, but rather whatever is in him is individuated.

Continuing

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After some personal difficulties, let's get this translation going again.

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (3)

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b) Analysis of the universal in praedicando

In this course, we cannot offer a complete study of the logical universal and its implications. We limit ourselves to analyzing briefly the various instances which correspond to the makeup of the universal. A text of St Thomas will set us on our way:

When one says ‘a thing which is actually being understood’ (intellectum in actu), there are two things implied, viz., (a) the thing which is being understood and (b) the fact that it is being understood.

Similarly, when one says ‘the abstracted universal’, there are two things implied, viz., (a) the nature itself of the thing and (b) its abstractness or universality. Therefore, the nature which happens to be understood intellectively (or to be abstracted or to be an intention of universality) does not itself exist except in singular things; but its being understood (or being abstracted or being an intention of universality) exists in the intellect.

We can see this by a comparison with a sensory power. For the power of sight sees the color of the apple without seeing its smell. Therefore, if someone asked where the color is that is seen without the smell, it is obvious that the color which is seen exists only in the apple; however, the fact that it is perceived without its smell happens to it because of the power of sight, since in the power of sight there exists a likeness of its color but not of its smell.

Similarly, the human-ness (humanitas) that is understood intellectively exists only in this or that man; but the fact that human-ness is apprehended without individual conditions—i.e., the fact that human-ness is abstracted, and that an intention of universality follows upon it—happens to human-ness insofar as it is perceived by the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the nature of the species without a likeness of the individual principles.

I, 85, 2, 2m

cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur: scilicet res quæ intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi.

Et similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur: scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentioni universalitatis, est in intellectu.

Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine eius odore. Si ergo quæratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore, manifestum est quod color qui videtur, non est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris.

Similiter humanitas quæ intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine: sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitatis secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturæ speciei, et non individualium principiorum .

I, 85, 2, 2m

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered (2)

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1.2. Nature of the universal

a) The various modes of universality

The Latin word 'universale' can be understood as 'unum versus alia', 'one versus others'. It therefore means one thing in relation to a plurality of others. Just as there are various modes of being in relation to other things, so there are various meanings of the term 'universal'*:

Universal
-----cognitive
----------linguistic: universale in dicendo [1]
----------logical: universale in praedicando [2]
-----ontological
----------essential: universale in essendo [3]
----------causal: universale in causando [4]

Let us explain these briefly:

[1] The universale in dicendo (it is also called the universale in significando, but this formulation can generate confusion, since not only is the term significative, but also the concept) is something 'one' insofar as it is a unique sign with respect to the plurality of meanings to which it refers. More precisely, it is about the categorematic linguistic term, which signifies a plurality of things, by means of the universal concept**. for example, the terms 'homo', 'man', 'hombre', 'uomo', 'Mensch', etc, refer to the plurality of men by means of the concept of 'man'.

[2] The universale in praedicando is something 'one' which by its very nature is capable of being predicated, as a concept, of a plurality of subjects:

universale est quod est aptum natum de pluribus praedicari.
EPH 1, lect. 10, n. 119; Cf. Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias 7, 17 a 39-40.

For example, the concept of 'man' is capable of being attributed to all the singular men.

[3] The universale in essendo is something 'one' which by its nature is capable of being in a plurality of beings:

universale est quod est pluribus inesse.

For example, human nature has a certain unity and is capable of being in a plurality of men.

[4] The universale in causando is something 'one' whose causality extends to a plurality of effects. The causal universal par excellence is God, whose subsisting being creates all beings by participation (Cf. Cf. SM, prœm.: "... substantiæ separatæ sunt universales et primæ causæ essendi.").

Logic formally studies [2], because second intention of predicability is a part of its formal object. But such a relation of predicability being always expressed in a linguistic term, and being always ultimately founded in things, logic should also take into consideration [1] and [3]. The investigation of the univeral in causando, on the other hand, in no way pertains to logic, but rather to philosophical theology (The philosophies of Plato and Hegel can be characterized, as to their structure, as two possible attempts to make the universal in causando coincide with the universal in praedicando).

* on these various meanings, cf. John of St Thomas, Ars logica II, q. 3, art. 1, 313 b 8 - 314 b 17.

** Cf. EPH 1, lect. 10, n. 121: ; "quando autem denominatur res ab eo quod est commune sibi et multis aliis, nomen huiusmodi dicitur significare universale, quia scilicet nomen significat naturam sive dispositionem aliquam, quae est communis multis". One can clearly see that the universal term signifies by means of the universal concept.

II. The Universal Concept, Formally Considered

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1. The Universal in communi

1.1. Origin of the universal

The concepts of simple apprehension are conceived by a process of abstraction from sense knowledge. The justification of such a process and its analysis awaits us in the philosophy of knowledge, and not logic. For our discipline, it is important to show briefly the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of the completed process of abstraction.

In the beginning, our senses perceive an aspect of sensible data (such as color or figure, for example) synthesized into an interior image called the phantasm. This is always singular and material, like the image I make of Peter or of John when I think of them. At the end of the process of abstraction - which should not be thought of as abstracting some sort of residue! -, the intelligence reaches the level of reality present in the sensible data, but not known by the senses, and the quiddity or ratio of the perceived thing, which will always be universal and immaterial, like the concept of man.

So abstraction involves a passage from the essence realized in the singular individual to the common essence, which does not include the individuating aspects, as St Thomas explains:

And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms;
I, 85, 1, c.

Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus;
I, 85, 1, c.

By abstraction, the human intelligence knows the 'form' or quiddity of the individual thing, but not in an individual way, but rather a universal way, that is attributable to all the individuals which possess such an essence. In this way the notion of 'man' can be predicated of every concrete man, which truly express the essence. The universality is therefore a property of our concepts, following necessarily from abstraction.

I. Placement of the Concept (6)

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3.2. Divisions

The term can be considered absolutely or as part of a proposition and of the syllogism. Considered absolutely, it is divided in the same way as the concept. We will study in the third part the syllogistic term. Therefore there remains to divide the term insofar as it is part of a proposition, which is to say the terminus enuntiativus:

terminus -
a: categorematicus
a1: nomen
a2: verbum

b: syncategorematicus

a: A categorematical term (or significative) is formally under a category (whose notion we will study in chapter 3), meaning it expresses something which language signifies through itself*. Vg 'man', 'walks'. The categorematical terms are principally divided into substantive and verb **.

a1: Here's how Aristotle defines the noun (=substantive):

The noun is therefore a sound of the voice, significant by convention, which prescinds from time and no part of which is significative if considered seperately***.

We find it is the definition of the term, to which two further specifications are added:
1) The noun prescinds from temporality, insofar as it signifies a reality in the essence, prior to its motion;
2) The noun is further divisible into significative parts: for example, the substantive 'man' consists of one syllable, or three letters, but these vocal elements and graphics have no meaning by themselves.

a2 We owe to Aristotle this definition of verb, in contrast to that of noun:

The verb is that which adds time to its own meaning, in which no part is significative, if considered separately, and is always a sign of something which is said of something else.

There are two important differences from the noun:

1) The verb always 'cosignifies' time, as done by some subject: for example, 'runs' is a verb because it connotes present time as being done by the implicit subject 'he', whereas 'trip' is a noun because, even though it signifies an action, it signifies it as a thing, and not per modum actionis;
2) The verb is always a sign of something which is said of something else, because it is always from the part of the predicate, insofar as it is always attributed to a subject, linguistically implicit or explicit.

N.B.: Pronouns, used alone, are always linked back to nouns, and participles to verbs. Vg. 'I', 'he', 'running', 'thinking'.

b In opposition to the categorematical terms, syncategorematical terms aren't formally contained in a category, but are the sign of some modifications made either to some other enunciative term, or to the entire proposition. In other words, the syncategorematical term does not signify something directly per se in reality, but expresses the modification of another sign. One might even say that it is not significative, but functional. Vg. 'all' in the proposition 'all men are mortal' specifies the extension of the subject; 'and' in the proposition 'man and angel are created spirits' links two terms which constitute the global subject of the enunciation.

Bear in mind that the same vocabulary word can be taken either categorematically or syncategorematically. For example, in the proposition 'only the cat meows', 'only' is a syncategorematical term, because it limits the action of meowing to the species of cats, while in the proposition 'the only cat meows', 'only' is taken categorematically, because it signifies an isolated (from other cats) cat. therefore to determine whether a some term is categorematical or syncategorematical, one should examine if it signifies directly something denoted in reality by the proposition, or if it is functional to the modus significandi of the proposition or its terms.

* CF :

Dicitur autem dictio categorematica, quae absolute ponit rem significatam circa aliquod suppositum; ut albus circa hominem, cum dicitur homo albus. I, 31, 3, c

A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." I, 31, 3, c

** Cf. EPH 1, lect. 1, n. 6; John of St Thomas, Ars logica, I, q. 1, art. 6, 109 b 1 - 25.

*** Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias 2, 16 a 19 - 21. The medieval translation is the following: "vox significativa secundum placitum, sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa, separata". Cf. EPH 1, lect. 4, nn. 38 - 43.

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3. The term

3.1. Notion

The concept, immanent fruit of the first operation, is a 'first intention', which is to say a being purely within the intellective order. Now because the human soul is substantially linked to the body, our concepts are always 'incarnate', so to speak, in a determinate language. For example, I cannot think the quiddity 'man' without at the same time expressing it, even if only internally, in a linguistic term - 'homo', 'man', 'uomo', 'hombre', 'homme', 'Mensch', etc.: there is never a thought without language spoken, written, or simply represented in the imagination. Between the written sign, the spoken word, and the intelligible concept arise the relations of meaning which Aristotle presents thusly:

Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias 1, 16 a 3-8

One sees that writing is an instrumental artificial sign for words, which are also instrumental artificial signs of concepts (mental experience [affections of the soul]), which are, as we have said, formal natural signs of things. On the one hand, writings and words change in history and space; concepts and essences of things, on the other hand, do not.

In this context, we can define the oral term (or written in reference to the oral) as

sound of the voice significative by convention. ("vox significativa ad placitum", Peri Hermeneias 2, 16 a 19)

Let us explain per partes:

- the sound of the voice is not just any noise, but a sound made by an animate living thing, and accompanied by some "mental experience" (De Anima B, 8, 420 b 25 - 31).

- this sound should bear some intentionality, which renders it meaningful, of the reality signified, by means of the concept. Note well that the concept is not known as such, since it is a formal sign.

- this meaningfulness is by convention and as such different from, for example, a groan or a cough.

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2.3. Divisions

a) by comprehension

1) in function of what is signified

The concept can be either simple or complex

A concept is simple when it signifies only one quiddity, even if this has a very dense comprehension, and therefore could be made explicit in many elements. A concept is also simple when only one essence is expressed in various terms. Vg. 'man', 'equilateral triangle' are simple concepts.

A concept is complex when it signifies more than one quiddity, even if expressed with only one term. Vg. 'blonde man', 'negro' [as in United Negro College Fund].

2) in function of how something is signified

The concept can be either concrete or abstract.

A concept is always abstracted from single existents (or constructed); nevertheless it is called concrete when it implies a subject, even if this remains indetermined. Vg. 'wise', 'white'.

A concept is called abstract in a special way when it signifies only the abstract form, apart from any subject. Vg. 'wisdom', 'whiteness'.

Nota bene: Do not confuse the concrete concept with the individual concept. 'humanity' [in the sense of human essence] is abstract; 'man' is concrete; 'this man' is individual.

b) by extension

1) in function of the way of denoting the individuals to which the concept refers

The concept can be either collective or 'divisive' or distributive

A concept is collective when it exists in a multitude considered as a whole, and not in the same individuals singularly considered. Vg. 'army', 'senate', 'the Roman Curia'.

A concept is 'divisive' or distributive when it exists in a multitude of individuals singularly considered. Vg. 'man', 'soldier', 'senator', 'official of the Roman Curia'.

2) In function of the quantity of individuals denoted

The concept can be either singular or individual, or common, which is in turn divided into either particular or universal.

A concept is singular when its extension is restricted to only one individual determined subject. Vg. 'this man', 'this army'.

A concept is common when its extension is not restricted to only one individual subject. It can then be particular, when it is communicable only to a part of the individuals contained under it, vg. 'some man', 'some army'; or universal, when its extension is not restricted in any way, that is when it is communicable to all the individuals contained in it, vg. 'each man', 'each army'.

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2.2 Properties of the concept: Comprehension and extension

a) Definition

Let us consider the concept 'man'. Even if it constitutes an intelligible unity which expresses the same human nature in all men, we can nevertheless submit this concept to an analysis, from which will emerge a certain number of intelligible aspects whose totality will distinguish the concept of man from every other; for example: 'substance', 'corporal', 'living', 'endowed with sensibility', 'endowed with reason'. In the more universal concept of 'animal', we will have: 'substance', 'corporal', 'living', 'endowed with at least one sense'. We call known of a concept the intelligible aspects which the mind discerns so in it, and which pertain to it necessarily. On the other hand, the same concept 'man' can be considered no longer in the aspects which it contains, but with regard to the individuals of which it can be said, like 'Peter', 'Paul', 'Italian', 'Mexican', 'dentist', 'boy', 'bishop', etc.

We are now ready to borrow from Maritain the following definitions of comprehension and extension:

1) The comprehension of a concept is its breadth with regard to the notes which characterize it.
2) The extension of a concept is the complete set of subjects (real or not) to which this can be attributed.

These definitions explain well comprehension and extension in their ontological foundation. It seems useful here to try two parallel definitions which are located on the formally logical plane:

1) The comprehension of a concept is the complete set of essential predicates which can be attributed to it.
2) The extension of a concept is the complete set of subjects (real or not) to which it can be attributed.

b) Laws of comprehension and extension

1) Statement:

Comprehension and extension are inversely related concepts.

2) Explanation:
The comprehension of the concept 'animal' is less than that of the concept 'man', since the note 'endowed with reason' with all its implications, does not pertain to 'animal'; Therefore this concept can be attributed to individuals (animals without reason) of which the concept 'man' cannot be said; therefore the extension of 'animal' will be greater than 'man'.

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2. The concept
2.1. Notion

a) Description

When the intelligence intuits a simple object, like 'man' or 'horse', at the same time it expresses internally its object, making of it a likeness. This is how St Thomas describes this process:

Quandocumque autem actu intelligit, quoddam intelligibile format, quod est quasi quaedam proles ipsius, unde et mentis conceptus nominatur.
De rationibus fidei 3, n. 958

One gathers the analogy implicit in the text: as a fecund woman conceives her son, so also the intellegence, as fertilized by abstraction, forms in itself a concept, or a similitudine of the quiddity actually taken in.

The process of conceptualization in its terminal phase consists of two poles: the concept itself generated in the mind, the object, normally outside the mind, of the likeness of which the concept is conceived.

b) Analysis

Being a likeness of the object which makes the object known, the concept is therefore a sign of the object. This is how St Thomas defines sign:

communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliquid cognoscatur.
QDV 9, 4, 4m.

(A complete theory of the sign from a thomist perspective can be found in John of St Thomas, Ars logica II, qq. 21 to 23.)

So that will be a sign, in the full sense of the word, the knowledge of which brings one to know some thing. For example, smoke is a sign of fire; a green light is a sign that the road is clear.

The notion of sign is doubly divided:

1) with regard to the origin of the sign:
α - natural
β - articifical or by agreement

α = a sign which is inserted into nature itself, vg smoke with respect to fire, crying with respect to pain
β = a sign depends on human choice, vg the various languages with respect to thought, street or highway signs with respect to circumstances of the street or highway

2) with regard to the relation itself of signification
x - formale seu in quo
y - intrumentale seu ex quo

x = a sign which makes known its meaning without the need to know first the sign itself; it is therefore a sign in which knowing the meaning happens in an immediate way.

y = a sign which makes known it meaning after the knower has first come to know the sign itself; it is therefore a sign by the knowing of which one comes to know the signified. For example, smoke is an instrumental sign, because the perception of smoke precedes the conclusion that there is a fire.

From this brief analysis, it can be seen that a concept is a natural formal sign of the quiddity which it expresses. It is natural because it does not depend on human institution; and it is formal because it refers to the quiddity without the need to first know the sign as such. The written or spoken word on the other hand is an artificial sign, because it is arbitrary and without natural relation to its ultimate meaning (with the exception in some sense of onomatopoeia), and it is an instrumental sign because one must first decipher the sign to access its meaning (as is apparent when one arrives in a foreign country).

c) Semantics of the notion

The notion itself of concept is expressed by various terms which have the same essential sense, but are distinguished by their connotations. Let us give a brief lexicon of the most common synonyms of 'concept'.

- intentio: this already encountered term signifies the concept as it is the product of the 'tension' from intelligence towards reality.

- verbum or verbum mentis (= mental word): this expression signifies the concept as it is like an 'internal word' in which the intellect says to itself the quiddity which it is understanding*.

- ratio: this term, as with the Greek λογος, has subtleties not translatable by the English word 'reason'; in the use under consideration here, it signifies either the object of the concept insofar as an intelligible notion**, or the concept itself as grasping this intelligible unity***.

- species expressa: a detailed study of this locution doesn't pertain to logic, but rather to theory of knowledge; we limit ourselves to noting that it signifies the concept as ideal expression of the quiddity****.

* - Cf In Io. 1, lect. 1, n. 25: Istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad intellectum, non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit; quia in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae.
** - Cf Sn 1, 2, 1, 3, c: ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis
*** - Cf CG 1, 53, n. 443: intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio.
**** - Cf John of St Thomas, Naturalis Philosophiae, IV pars: De ente mobili animato, q. 11, a. 1, 345 b 12-19: "In sententia S. Thomae quatuor sunt ponenda in intellectu nostro ad intelligendum requisita, scilicet potentia seu virtus (ad quam etiam pertinet habitus seu lumen), species intelligibilis, actus intelligendi et verbum seu conceptus aut species expressa." At this juncture the synonymy invoked by the commentator of St Thomas interests us. The analytic study of the four instants highlighted here pertains to theory of knowledge.

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Ia part: Logic of the Concept

Chapter One: Placement of the Concept

1. Apprehension, the foundation of the concept

We have seen in the introduction that a line of reasoning can be broken down into judgments, which are resolved in turn to apprehensions. This is thus the simplest act of the mind. For example, if we conceive the notion of 'man', without thinking anything further, the act of grasping what the word 'man' means is nothing other than the apprehension of the notion of man.

We need to clarify three things:

1) The object of apprehension is, generically taken, a certain determined thing, in latin a quid. Formalizing quid, we speak of 'quiddity' (quidditas), which is that which, in the thing, responds to the question, "what is it?" In its being known, such quiddity is actually neither complex nor divisible.

2) Therefore apprehension is not capable of further resolution. In consequence Aristotle calls it the understanding of indivisibles (indivisibilium intelligentia (cf Aristotle, De Anima Γ, 6, 430 a 26-27), which is to say the intellectual intuition of an aspect of reality grasped in an indivisible way. Among the scholastics it is known, with the same meaning, as simple apprehension (simplex apprehensio).

3) The word 'quiddity' has two synonyms, 'essence' and 'nature' which refer to the same reality, but under different aspects. 'Essence', in the generic sense, signifies a certain ontological determination; 'nature' signifies on the other hand the same determination, but insofar as it is an intrinsic principle of operation; 'quiddity' also signifies the same determination, but as a principle of intelligibility, expressible as a definition. 'Essence' therefore has a strictly ontological connotation, 'nature' has a dynamic connotation, 'quiddity' a logico-critical connotation. In this work, we will use these various expressions linked to these diverse connotations (On this theme, cf St Thomas, EE 1, n. 3:

But the term nature used in this way seems to signify the essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no thing is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact that this is what is signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence because the being has existence through it and in it.

nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse EE 1, n. 3

We now have all the elements needed to understand the definition which St Thomas offers of simple apprehension*:

the intellect, by one of its activities, understands things simply; understanding, for instance, man or ox, or any such thing, simply in itself
SA 3, lect. 11, n. 746

una operationum intellectus est, secundum quod intelligit indivisibilia, puta cum intelligit hominem aut bovem, aut aliquid huiusmodi incomplexorum.
SA 3, lect. 11, n. 746.

It is therefore the operation of the mind by which the intellect grasps a notion in an indivisible way.

* cf also EPA, proem., n.1: One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is

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5. The sources of logic

As all of the preceding shows, the logic we propose here is intimately linked to a realist philosophy of being, aristotelian in nature, although we will add in the appendix a brief introduction to contemporary symbolic logic. Therefore we leave aside whole and important parts of the history of logic, such as stoic logic or occamian logic (cf in this regard the excellent book of J. M. Bochenski, O.P., Formale Logik, Freiburg i. B. - Munchen, 1956).

Almost all the material presented in this work finds its first and genius elaboration in the Organon of Aristotle (384/83 - 322BC), which is organized as follows:

Logic of the universal
materially considered: The Categories

Logic of the proposition: Peri Hermeneias

Logic of argumentation
formal logic
of the demonstrative syllogism: Prior Analytics

material logic
of the demonstrative syllogism: Posterior Analytics
logic of the probable syllogism: The Topics
logic of the the sophisticated syllogism: Sophistici elenchi

To this system already quite complete, the neo-platonist Porphyry (232/33 - 304AD) adds a brief treatise on universals formally considered, conceived by himself as a complement to the categories of Aristotle, and titled Isagoge (Greek and Latin here)

Further major developments of Aristotelian logic are contained in the following works, in chronological order:

Manlius Severinus Bœtius (Roma, 480 - Pavia 524), Commentary on Porphyry and Aristotle in Opera omnia, tomus posterior, PL 64, col. 9 - 1224.

Petrus Hispanus (Lisbona, 1210/20 - Roma, 1277), [1276 - 1277, Holy Father by the name of IOANNES XXI], Summulæ logicæ.

Sanctus Thomas Aquinatis O.P. (Aquino, 1224/5 - Fossanova, 1274), Expositio Libri Peryermenias [commento sul Peri Hermeneias di Aristotele]. Ed. leonina, t. 1*/1. Trad. ingl. di J.A. Oesterle, Aristotle on Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Peri Hermeneias)

Id., Expositio Libri Posteriorum [commento sugli Analitici secondi di Aristotele]. Ed. leonina, t. 1*/2. English translation by F.R. Larcher, Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle.

Ioannes a Sancto Thoma O.P. (Lisbona, 1589 - Lerida, 1644), Ars logica seu de forma et materia ratiocinandi. Ed. Reiser.

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4.2. The division between formal and material logic

Many authors preface the division we have just studied with a division of the whole of logic and its three parts into formal logic and material logic. Jacques Maritain does so, and justifies it in this way:

Logic being the art which permits us to proceed with order, ease, and without error in the act itself of reason, it is necessary to consider both the form and the matter of our reasonings, whence comes its division into two parts: minor logic or "formal" logic and major logic or "material" logic.

Minor logic studies the formal conditions of the science and analyzes or "resolves", as is said, the reasoning into principles on which it depends from the point of view of its form or its disposition; it teaches the rules necessary for the reasoning to be correct or well constructed considering the disposition of the materials. (...)

Major logic studies the material conditions of the science, and analyzes or resolves reasonings into the principles on which they depend for their material or in other words their content; it shows to which conditions the materials of the reasoning should respond such that it have a conclusion certain at every point, not only from form, but also from the material - that is, a certain and true conclusion.
(Jacques Maritain, Elements de philosophie,t. II, L'ordre des concepts, 1. Petite logique, Paris, 1966, pp. 10-11 (our translation). On the same theme, cf. John of St Thomas, Ars logica, "praeludium secundum", 5 a 32 - b 26.

This division, as can be seen in the text just quoted, best suits logic of argumentation, where the order of the concepts of the reasoning can be clearly distinguished on the one hand, and the truth of the conclusion which follows from the rest. In fact, the real object of a proposition is known either immediately or mediately; now if it is mediately, the study of the conditions of truth pertains to material logic of argumentation; if on the other hand it is immediately grasped, no need to search for it! So in what concerns the logic of the universal, we can distinguish with certainty a material aspect, which corresponds to the generic meanings of universal concepts (as we will see in the course), and a formal aspect, which corresponds to the intention of universality itself. But this last is nothing other than predicability; now the study of diverse modes of being predicable involve, if only in a formal way, the ultimately real subjects, to which a concept can be attributed; therefore the analyses of the relations of universality take on a "material" aspect. for this reason, the scholastic treatises of logic place the study of predicability in the major logic. (this already appears in John of St Thomas, who treats De universali secundum se as well as the individual types of universality in the secunda pars artis logicae titled, De intrumentis logicalibus ex parte materiae. The same for Josephus Gredt, in his Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae, vol. 1, logica/philosophia naturalis, Freiburg i. B., 1929, then in the op. cit. of Jacques Maritain.)

One can see therefore that the distinction between formal and material logic is fully justified with regard to argumentation, but only partially with regard to the universal, whereas it appears inadequate with regard to the proposition. Therefore, we do not consider such a division essential to the whole of logic.

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4. Division of logic
4.1. Essential division
4.1.1. Foundation of the division

a) Statement
Logic is formally divided based on the proximate foundation of second intentions, which is the various ways of being known in reality that follow from the operations of the mind and their products.

b) Demonstration
m1 The formal object of logic is made up of second intention relations
M1 but every relation (whether real or of reason) is formally divided according to its foundation.

(In a relation, 4 things should be distinguished: the subject, the term, the foundation, and the relation itself. For example, paternity has for its subject the father, for its term the son, for its foundation active generation, and for relation paternity itself. The foundation being what accounts for the being of the relation, it is from this that generic relations can be divided. On this problem, which is specifically metaphysical, see SM, 5, lect. 17, nn. 1001 - 1005; John of St Thomas, Ars logica, II, q. 17, art.3; q. 2, art. 2, in fine.)

C1=m2Therefore the formal object of logic is formally divided according to the foundations of the second intention relations;
M2 But second intention relations are founded on the being of the thing as known, thus on the products of the mind;
C2Therefore the formal object of logic is formally divided according to the various products of the mind.

4.1.2.

4.1.2. The division itself

a) Demonstrative exposition

m Logic is formally divided according to the various ways of being known of being in the mind
M But being can be known by the human intellect as human in three ways:
1 - in an abstract way, attributable to many subjects;
2 - in the way of composition between an abstract form and the subject to which it is attributed, or in the way of division between an abstract form and the subject of which it is denied;
3 - in the way of inference from two or more attributions, in such a way that there follows a conclusion, in which the link between the attributed form and the subject which receives the attribution are mediated by one or more middle terms;
C therefore logic is formally divided into three parts, corresponding to the three modes of the human mind knowing being, such that:

1 - a logic of the universal, ie the attirbutable concept;
2 - a logic of attribution, ie of the proposition which results from the composition or division between a predicated concept and a subject;
3 - a logic of argumentation, ie of argumentation which, linking two or more attributions, draws some conclusion, in other words a new attribution, in which the link between the predicated concept and the subject is mediated by one or more middle terms.

b) Outline of the course consequent to this division

A course in logic, of all things, should proceed logically, so we will follow the division which we have just finished founding and establishing. Therefore, we will dedicate a part of our study to each type of product of the mind and to the corresponding second intentions.

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3.2 Epistemological placement of logic

In an introduction such as this, we cannot offer a complete classification of the sciences, since such an undertaking presupposes the general theory of knowledge, which is only available to us at the end of logic (For a first approach to the theory of knowledge, see the course of Critics, specifically Franciscus MORANDINI S.J., Critica, Roma, 1963, pp. 380 - 431. The fundamental texts of epistemology are EBT 5 and 6 (same in English); SM 6, lect 4 (same in English); 11, lect 7 (same in English). For a more complete treatment, see Juan Jose SANGUINETI, La filosofia de la ciencia segun Santo Tomas, Pamplona, 1977.)

Nevertheless, it seems proper to indicate from the beginning the distribution of the disciplines which revolve around the cognitive act.

Intellective intentionality / science

On the part of the knower
In its essence
First intentions / psychology
Second intentions / logic

In its expression
in general / linguistics
in particular / grammar

On the part of the being known
as being / metaphysics
as reachable by the intellect / critics

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3.1.2.3. Analytical definition of the logical science

Collecting all of the preceding, we can analytically define logic as

the instrumentally speculative and modally practical science which has for its material object the products of reason, for formal object quod the second intention relations of reason, and for formal object quo the light of the first principles of reason.

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3.1.2.2 The notion of second intention

a) The notion of intentio

The term intentio comes from 'in-tendere', which signifies to tend towards (something)*. In the psychology of the will, intention designates the act which bears one towards the end, and on which depends the choice of means. In the noetic field, intentionality refers to the tension of the knowing subject towards the known object. In St Thomas, intentio does not signify the intellective act, but rather the product which is produced at the end of expressing itself and rendering present to itself the thing which it knows:

I call intellectual intention that which the intellect conceives in itself of the thing understood.

Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta.
CG 4, 11, n. 3466

The intellective intentio is therefore, on the one hand (ex parte subiecti), the product (concept, proposition, argument) by which the mind reaches the being of the thing; on the other hand (ex parte obiecti), intentio designates the object which is known by the mind. The relation established by the intentio between the knowing subject and the known object constitutes intentionality.

b) Division

The intentio can have for its object something real - and this is ordinarily the case - or it can have something that follows from the act itself of grasping the real; in the first case, the foundation of the intention in reality will be immediate, whereas in the second case it will be mediated:

The reality corresponds to the concept in two ways. First, immediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the idea of a thing existing outside the mind, for instance, a man or a stone. Secondly, mediately, when, namely, something follows the act of the intellect, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that the reality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through the medium of the intellect’s concept of the thing. For instance, the intellect understands animal nature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and consequently it understands that nature as a genus : to this act, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not correspond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus ; and yet there is something that corresponds to the thought that is the foundation of this mental process.
QDP 1, 1, 10m

intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum considerat illud. Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, id est mediante intelligentia rei: verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis aliis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit eam ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res.
QDP 1, 1, 10m

To this twofold relation between intellect in act and things corresponds the distinction between first intention and second intention. First intention is therefore that which considers things in their real being (and therefore called first); whereas second intention is that which reflectively considers what is known of the thing (and therefore called second). Second intention can therefore be defined objectively as the logical relation of reason inherent in what is known of the thing (insofar as such being is different from the being in se of the thing itself); Subjectively, on the other hand, second intentions signify the concepts by which such relations of reason are known (St Thomas distinguishes in this way between nomen primae intentionis and nomen secundae intentionis, vg SN 1, 23, 1, 3, c. John of St Thomas defines the two types of intentions, objectively considered, in his Ars logica, q. 2, art. 2, 291 a 40 - 44: "Illae ergo affectiones seu formalitates, quae conveniunt rei prout in se, vocantur primae intentiones, quae conveniunt rei prout cognita, vocatur secundae" - "Therefore those affections or formalities, which conform to the thing as it is in se, are called first intentions, whereas those which conform to the thing as it is known are called second.")

The following text summarizes well what must be remembered about logical being of reason, also called second intentions:

there are two kinds of beings: beings of reason and real beings. The expression being of reason is applied properly to those notions which reason derives from the objects it considers, for example, the notions of genus, species and the like, which are not found in reality but are a natural result of the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, i.e., being of reason, constitutes the proper subject of logic.
SM 4, lect. 4, n. 574

ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.
SM 4, lect. 4, n. 574

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3.1.2. The logical being of reason

3.1.2.1. The logical relation of reason

We know that the ens rationis has no other "existence" than being the object of knowledge. There are therefore necessarily relations of reason with foundation in reality, since these pertain to the genus of beings of reason. Let us now consider the diversity of subjects make up the support for such relations of reason, and we'll help ourselves with an example.

i) in the case of the connection between the eye and the colored object it sees, the thing seen, in its extra-mental reality, founds a relation of reason to the seer; the same extra-mental reality, on the other hand, is the subject of said relation of reason.

ii) in the case on the other hand of the relation of attribution between 'polite' and 'Peter' in the proposition, 'Peter is polite', the foundation of the conceptual relation is both in the extra-mental reality constituted by the being polite of Peter; but the subject of that same relation is in the being known of this proposition, in other words the product of the mind. It can also be called remote foundation of the logical relation the reality signified by the product of the mind, whereas this last will be the proximate foundation of it.

From these premises it follows that logic has for its formal object quod (ie for subiectum) the relations of reason between concepts emitted by reason in act, and therefore consecutive to the intellective act itself and its product. In the act itself, for example, in which I know that Peter is polite and in which I express such knowledge saying interiorly 'Peter is polite', I already construct the relation of reason which unites 'polite' and 'Peter'. In the same way, I can say that 'man is a species' because the concept of 'man' is attrubutable to concrete men as a species to its individuals. St Thomas explains it this way:

Now there are certain aspects to which nothing corresponds in the thing understood: but the things thus conceived the mind does not attribute to things as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood: for example, the aspect of genus or species
QDP 7, 6, c.

Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in se ipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt; sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei
QDP 7, 6, c.

In this text we encounter the term intentio, the analysis of which will clarify both logical being and its foundations.

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3.1.1. The ens rationis, genus of the logical being

a) Definition

The expression ens rationis signifies an entity that depends on reason for its being. But this dependence can be taken in three ways:

1 effectively: something depends on reason insofar as it comes from it through efficient causality, as the acts and products of the mind (for example judgment and the proposition considered as a product of judgment).
2 subjectively: something depends on reason insofar as it is based in it, like a material cause, as the intellectual habits (for example the habitus of logical science).
3 objectively: something depends on reason exclusively insofar as it "exists" before it as an object, without it having in se any real ontological consistency, as the relations between concepts (for example the attribution of a predicate to a subject).

The being of reason in the strict sense, which is of interest to us here, corresponds uniquely to the third meaning, while the first two meanings are in reality of real beings. We can define it in this way with John of St Thomas:

ens habens esse obiective in ratione, cui nullum esse correspondet in re.
Ars logica, II, q. 2, art. 1, 285 b 14-16

The essential characteristics of a being of reason consist therefore in the absence of ontological positivity, its "being" reducing itself to purely being an object. For example, light is a real being, which can also be conceptualized by the mind, whereas darkness, per se, refers to nothing real, but only the privation of light, for which reason it is a being of reason.

One can see therefore that

The being of reason is that which exists only through and in the awareness we have of it, insofar as it is a construct of the mind, whereas real beings are those which exist independently of the awareness we have of them.

b) Division

The notion of ens rationis is divided, for the purposes of the present subject, in two different ways:

1. division based on the subject to which the being of reason is attributed:
[-a] without foundation in things
[-b] with foundation in things

[-a] implies a real foundation to which the being of reason is attributed, for example the air by darkness.
[-b] has no real foundation at all to which the being of reason is legitimately attributed, for example the unicorn or chimera.

2. division based on the object itself conceived but nonexistent in reality:
[-a] negation
[-b] relation of reason

In fact, the notion of ens rationis consists formally in its opposition to real being, that is in its incapacity to exist**. Now such a notion can either be something purely negative, or something positive. If negative, we have negation; if positive, we have only relation, because it is said only in regard to some other thing, without implying any absolute positivity, which would consist of real being. An example:
[-a] blindness, privation of sight; darkness, negation of light.
[-b] being seen by something, relation to the one who sees; being predicated, relation of a concept to some other in a proposition.

c) Application to logic

By these distinctions, we can explain the genus of being which formally specifies logic. It consists in the relations of reason which the mind constructs on coming to know reality and which therefore are founded in it. We must state more precisely what formally consitutes these relations and distinguishes them from other things, that is their specific difference.

** In this regard, see QDV 21, 1, c:

What is merely conceptual, however, can be of only two kinds: negation and a certain kind of relation. Every absolute positing signifies something existing in reality. Thus to being, the first intellectual conception, one adds what is merely conceptual—a negation; for it means undivided being. But true and good, being predicated positively, cannot add anything except a relation which is merely conceptual.

For a theoretical justification of this division of ens rationis, see John of St Thomas, Ars logica, II, q. 2, art. 1, 287 b 13 - 288 a 39

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3. Analysis of the formal object quod of logic
3.1. Formal object quod considered in se
The relations of reason existing among its concepts do not exist outside the act itself of reason. For example, when I say that "Peter is polite", politeness and Peter exist in reality outside the mind, as well as the inherence of polite in Peter; but the bond of attribution through which the predicate 'polite' is referred to the subject 'Peter' exists only through and in the act of thinking 'Peter' as 'polite'(Cf CG I, 58,n. 490: "Propositionis per intellectum componentem et dividentem formatae compositio in ipso intellectu existit, non in re quae est extra animam"; SM 7, lect 17, n. 1658: "Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei".). Therefore it is said that such conceptual relations are beings of reason (entia rationis). We must now analyze this notion.

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2.2.2. The object of logic

From all that we have said in the first part of the introduction, it follows that the products of reason (and emphatically not its operations!) are what terminate the logical science, in other words are its material object. Now the products of reason, such as the definition, the statement or proposition, the syllogism are not considered by the logician as the product of the corresponding operation, but exclusively under the aspect of the order which reason establishes between the concepts in the definition or the proposition, then between the propositions in argumentation, in such a way as to grasp the truth. Therefore the formal object quod of logic consists in the relations constructed by reason in its proper product, and aimed at the truth, such as the relation of predicability of one concept to another, or that of actual attribution in a proposition, or above all that of illation in an argument. To know the correctness of such relations, that is their ordinability to the true, logic is founded on first principles immediately accessible to the natural light of the intellect, which therefore constitute its formal object quo, such as the principle of identity. In synthesis:

The material and formal quo objects are easily understood; on the other hand, it is necessary to inquire more deeply into the formal object quod: in what exactly do these relations between concepts and propositions which logic should study consist?

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2.2 Determining the specific difference of logic
2.2.1. The notion of object in general
a) Definition
Etymologically, "object" translates "ob-iectum", from "ob-icere", "to put before" or "to present". Its use follows this origin: the object of an inquiry, a discipline, a faculty is that which stands before, not in a purely casual way, but rather insofar as it determines.
This is how St Thomas explains this point:

Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight.
I,1,7,c.

b) Division
Taking their cue from this doctrine, posterior scholastics distinguished:
obiectum
[a] formal object
[aa] formal object quo: eg. light
[ab] formal object quod: eg. color as such

[b] material object: eg. the colored thing

The material object [b] is the thing (res) which is presented to the potency or habitus and in which their act terminates, for which reason it is also called the terminative object. The formal object [a], on the other hand, is the aspect under which the thing (ratio) is presented to the potency or habitus and which moves it to act, for which reason it is also called the motive act*. For example, the sense of sight has for its formal object color (the green of the tree), and for material object the physical colored body (the tree).

But it is necessary to be still more precise. In fact, the formality of the object is two-fold: there is a formality which constitutes the formal object in its being, and there is another formality which constitutes the same formal object in its being reachable by the potency or habitus which will be specified by it**. For example, color specifies vision (the visive potency) by the above two conditions: it is necessary to have, from the being of the colored thing, the effective presence of the accident color, and it is necessary to have, from the being knowable of the colored thing, the effective presence of the light which renders it visible in act. The first dimension is called the object quod, because it is what is reached by the potency or habitus, whereas the second dimension of the same formal object is called quo, because it is that by which the object quod is reached.

Synthetically, one can see that the notion of object of a faculty or habit includes three dimensions:
1 - the thing "objectified" or reached (ie obiectum materiale);
2 - the formal aspect (ratio quae) which is "objectified" or reached in this thing (ie obiectum formale quod)
3 - the formal aspect (ratio qua) which ultimately makes this thing in its being the object of a determined faculty or habit (ie obiectum formale quo)

One will note that the formal object quod is formal with respect to the material object, because it determines the ontological dimension of the thing under consideration; but at the same time, the same formal object quod is material with respect to the formal object quo, because it is determinable by its reachability.

When one scientifically analyzes a faculty (intellect, will, sensible appetite, etc) or a habit (scientia, faith, etc), one should always determine these three modalities of the object.

Let us note in closing that the formal object quod of a science is also called, in the language of St Thomas, subiectum. This is justified by the fact that such a formal object quod constitutes the subject of attribution of all the predicates which will be demonstrated in said science***.

*: Cf De Caritate, 4, c:

but in object something is considered as formal and something as material. Formal however in the object is that according to which the object is referred to a potency or habit; material however that in which this is found: such that if we were to speak of the object of the potency of sight, its formal object is color, or something of the sort, for insofar as something is colored, to that degree it is visible; but the material object is body to which color inheres.

**: Cf Iacobus [Santiago] RAMIREZ, O.P., De fide divina (Opera omnia, t.11), Salamanca, 1994, p.25:

"However the formal object is subdistinguished into purely formal and not purely formal. For the ratio obiecti, which is the formal object, can be twofold, namely on the one hand, the ratio of the thing-object as it is a thing, absolutely, and this is called ratio formalis for which it is the object and to which the motion or drive of a potency or habit or act terminates, and therefore it is called the formal object quod; on the other hand, the ratio of the thing-object, not insofar as it is a thing, but only insofar as it is the object or related to potency, habit or act, and this is called ratio formalis qua the thing-object first moves potency, habit or act, and is therefore called the formal object quo".

***: Cf I, 1, 7, c:

The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object.

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2.1.3. logica docens (logic for teaching) and logica utens (logic for use)

a) Preliminary notions

1. logica docens is logic as proposing in a demonstrative way the necessary rules to arrive at knowledge (scientia) in a perfect state.
2. logica utens is logic as applying these rules to a particular case.

b) Thesis

1. statement: logica utens is the same habitude as logica docens.
2. demonstration:
i) from the specific object of both
logica docens and logica utens both have for their specific object the order of conspets, and they differ only insofar as logica utens considers such order under the practical aspect of application to research.
ii) from the notion of habitus
M A new habitus is necessary where there is a new difficulty to conquer, a new indetermination to remove;
m but such a new difficulty is not found in applying knowledge of logic: in fact this follows necessarily, on account of abstraction from whence come the concepts;
C The application of knowledge of logic does not require a new habitus.
3. Nota Bene: There is a difference between logical scientia and moral scientia. In the latter, a new habitus is necessary, viz. prudence, since one passes from the human act considered in abstracto, universally and necessarily, to the concrete act, individual and contingent. Since there is a special difficulty in the application of moral science, the virtue of prudence intervenes.

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2.1.2. Logic as a speculative science

a) Preliminary notions

St Thomas distinguishes the speculative from the practical in this way:

As is said in The Soul: “Practical knowledge differs from speculative knowledge in its end.” For the end of speculative knowledge is simply truth, but the end of practical knowledge, as we read in the Metaphysics, is action.

Now, some knowledge is called practical because it is directed to a work. This happens in two ways. In the first way, it is directed in act—that is, when it is actually directed to a certain work, as the form is which an artist preconceives and intends to introduce into matter. This is called actual practical knowledge and is the form by which knowledge takes place. At other times, however, there is a type of knowledge that is capable of being ordered to an act, but this ordering is not actual. For example, an artist thinks out a form for his work, knows how it can be made, yet does not intend to make it. This is practical knowledge, not actual, but habitual or virtual.

At still other times, knowledge is utterly incapable of being ordered to execution. Such knowledge is purely speculative. This also happens in two ways. First, the knowledge is about those things whose natures are such that they cannot be produced by the knowledge of the knower, as is true for example, when we think about natural things. Second, it may happen that the thing known is something that is producible through knowledge but is not considered as producible; for a thing is given existence through a productive operation
QDV 3,3,c.

cf also SA 3,lect. 15, n. 820; SM 2,lect.2, nn. 290-291; I14,16,c; 79,11,c.

b) Thesis
1. statement: Logic, by reason of its principles, is instrumentally speculative, even though it implies a certain practical mode.

2. demonstration:
i) from the purpose of logic
m The scope of logic is to flee error, and therefore to know the truth fleeing error;
Mbut no science having truth for its scope is practical, but tends to knowledge through itself;
C Logic is therefore speculative
ad m Logic doesn't consider the products of reason ultimately as producible, but as ordered to knowledge; therefore it is instrumentally speculative (cf EBT 5,1,2m: "res autem de quibus est logica non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propetr seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam alias scientias".) and therefore possesses a practical mode: the proper goal of logic being knowing, one also tries to construct syllogisms, the scope of the science which produces these remains speculative.

ii) from the principles of logic
we may also anticipate the supreme principles of logic: "two things identical to a third are identical to one another"; "Everything said of a universal subject is said of all the particular subjects it comprises"; but these principles are purely speculative.

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2. Definition of logic
2.1 Determining the genus
2.1.1 Logic as science and art

a) Preliminary notions

1. science: cf supra
2. art
In the greco-medieval view, the notion of art meant a certain intellectual habitude (habitus)which concerned things to be made. It is therefore defined as recta ratio factibilium. In a strict sense, what is to be made encompasses every external product (house, ship, etc); taken in a wider sense however, it encompasses also internal products (calculations, reasonings, etc). External products are the object of the mechanical arts, while the internal products are the object of the liberal arts.

3. conditions necessary to be the object of an "art"
i) It is necessary that the making of a product implies a certain indetermination. For example, there is between seeing a table and making a table this difference, that the act of seeing the table is totally determined by nature, while the action of making the table is inderterminate, and so can fail. The habitus if art serves to remove this indetermination, proposing rules and directions to make the determined product.
ii) It is necessary that the product being made be guided by certain means and determinations to reach the end of realizing the art, that is universal means. Otherwise the art could not remove the indetermination of the product to be made: one would need to invent an art every single time which would be the same as not having one. In art, determination of the laws takes away the indetermination of the product.

b) Thesis
1. statement: Logic is both a science and a liberal art
2. demonstration:
i) science
m Logic scrutinizes the products proper to each act of the mind, knows their nature and deduces universal rules;
M But to establish universal rules from the being of a thing is proper to science;
C therefore logic is a science.
(St Thomas various times calls logic a science. Cf. SM 1,lect. 1, n. 32: "quaedam [artes sint] vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut scientiae logicales"; cf also SM 1, lect. 3, n. 57

ii) art
logic responds to the conditions of art:
- in reasoning, there is a certain indetermination. Although in fact the act of reason is ordered in itself to the true, there is also the possibility of error, which shows a certain indetermination, due to the discursive character of our intelligence (neither God nor angels need logic!). If error is possible, there is also the possibility of something to help us avoid such error.
- Reason can be guided by certain fixed, necessary and universal rules (like those of the syllogism*).
C The two conditions are present in reasoning because logic is a liberal art.

* Cf II-II,47,2,3m: "omnis applicatio rationis rectae ad aliquid factibile pertinet ad artem. (...) Quia igitur ratio speculativa quaedam facit, puta syllogismum, propositionem et alia huiusmodi, in quibus proceditur secundum certas et determinatas vias; inde est quod respectu horum potest salvari ratio artis"
"Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: (...) Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art"
Cf also I-II,57,3,3m: "etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales"
"Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but “liberal” arts"

Interlude

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A break from the translation, and a quote from the introduction to Physics, Or Natural Hearing of Aristotle, translated by Greg Coughlin:

Logic is another art which is radically affected by denying that nature works for some good, for logic is another art which intends to help nature do what it is ordered to, in this case, to know. The considerations of the end found in the Physics is presupposed to a proper consideration of logic, medecine, and any other arts which are directed to the achievement of natural ends.

So if we deny that nature acts for an end, no logic, no medecine, and so on.

Is there a circularity in this: that we must presuppose the Physics to study logic, but that logic is the method of the Physics? No, because it is not only the considerations of the end, but what is considered of the end that is presupposed, that is to say, not only knowledge of the end, but the structure of the end embedded in nature that is reflected in logic (and the Physics as well).

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1.2 Solution

a) Position taken: Scientific logic is not necessary to acquire science in its imperfect state, but it is necessary by strict necessity of end to acquire science in its perfect state.

b) Demonstration:

i) part one of the the solution
1. everyday experience
2. Logic is only an instrument adopted by intelligence to help it know what it per se knows, since this is by definition a cognitive faculty.
3. per absurdum: if intelligence could not acquire science in an imperfect state, it would not be able to grasp the first elements of this instrument.

ii) part two of the solution
m Logic is completed by proceeding with order, easily and without error in reasoning;
M But it is evident that to proceed with order, easily and without error is not merely useful, but rather necessary for the very being of science;
C Therefore, logic is necessary by a strict necessity of end to acquire science in its perfect state. (SM,2,lect. 5, n. 335: absurdum est, quod homo simul quaerat scientiam et modum qui convenit scientiae. Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis.
For it is absurd, that someone should at the same time be seeking both the science and the mode appropriate to the science. And this is why one should learn logic before the other sciences, because logic deals with the way of proceeding common to all the other sciences.)

2. Analytical Introduction (2)

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Part 1: The necessity of logic

1.1 Preliminary notions

We ask ourselves if and how logic is necessary to reach scientific knowledge (in the Aristotelian sense here used), which is to say, as a preliminary sketch, an intellective organic knowing, excluding all error. Therefore let us clarify these three notions

a) Logic

Description (cf supra): Logic is the art that directs the act of reasoning itself in the search for truth.

Distinctions:
i) Natural logic is nothing other than the natural faculty of the intelligence of man, insofar as he is capable of reason.
ii) Scientific logic is a habit (habitus) added to the intelligence to complete its initial capacity to reason. By habit is meant a stable quality, disposing the subject to be good or bad or to act well or badly. An entitative habit perfects in the line of being (vg grace), while an operative habit perfects in the line of acting (vg the theological virtues)

b) Necessity

St Thomas defines necessity in this way:

The word “necessity” is employed in many ways. For that is necessary which cannot not be.
Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle:

either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible

or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is “natural” and “absolute necessity.”

In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent.

On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called “necessity of end,” and sometimes also “utility.”

On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called “necessity of coercion.” (I,82,1,c)

Notice that necessity of end is subdivided into necessity of strict end (food to live) and necessity of moral end (the means for a journey).

c) Scientific knowledge

Aristotelian definition: cognitio certa per causis (cf Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, A, 2, 71 b 9-11: We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is.)

Therefore, it is an intellective knowing which is:
i)certain, which is to say that it excludes the possibility that the contradictory could be true
ii)per causas, which is to say it goes beyond the pure phaenominality of the object to grasp its constitutive causes, or trace the properties of the object back to to their causes.

Distinctions to be made in view of resolving the current problem:
i) science in an imperfect state, or knowledge of the first conclusions of this science, deficient knowledge with regard to certitude and with regard to the demonstration of the more remote conclusions, and also the solution of objections;
ii) science in a perfect state, or knowledge which satisfies all the demands of the definition of science, and which can follow to the end the demonstrative process with due rigor, and also refute adversaries and resolve objections.

2. Analytical Introduction

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In a scientific investigation (in the aristotelian sense of the term science), it is necessary to show why the studied object exists, then in what this consists. In the first part of the introduction, we have only partially resolved these two issues. In fact, we have shown what is the finality of this discipline which we cal logic, and what material it regards. Now we must complete this research. As regards the why of logic, since we are dealing with an instrument, it is necessary to determine if and in what way it is necessary to reach its assigned goal (part 1): since if an instrument is not necessary, it has no reason to be. With regard to its nature, we should clarify what its specific object(parts 2 and 3), and how the discipline should be divided with that in view(part 4). Finally, we will indicate briefly what are the sources of logic(part 5).

General Overview (6)

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3.2 Structure of the acts of the mind in specie

Setting aside perception or the sensible image of the thing signified, which does not pertain to the logician, we find the following structure of the three operations of the mind (In 1 Sent, EBD 5.3)

Some observations:
1. Many authors use indifferently the words 'concept' and 'term' to designate the product of the first operation, such as John of St Thomas or Roger Verneaux. We prefer rather to distinguish in vocabulary the immaterial product of simple apprehension and its necessary linguistic concretization, whether one is in fact speaking or merely thinking.

2. One will note that both judgment and reasoning have for their object the pertaining of a certain quiddity to a certain thing. In fact, the difference between these two operations is found only in the mind, while their final scope is always an affirmation or a negation. In the case of judgment, the real thing signified in the proposition is known in an immediate way, whereas with reasoning, it is reached in a mediated way. If the operations of the mind are considered from the point of view of the reality signified, there are only two (the second being divided into immediate and mediated); but when considered from the point of view of the operation as such, they are then three, since judgment and reasoning constitute, in the mind, different processes.

We are now prepared to describe logic in a more precise way. It is the art that allows one to proceed with due order in the construction of propositions and arguments, in a way that reaches the truth. One can thus already see that logic has for its characteristic object the relations between the concepts in propositions and arguments, insofar as such relations can be ordered to the truth.

General Overview (5)

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Let us universalize the results of this brief analysis, thereby distinguishing the thinking subject:

(a) The operation itself or the act of the mind as expressing its content (the thought in the sense of act).
(b) The product ("opera o operato") made up of the mind inside itself (the thought in the sense of product), which is an instrument, but not the object of knowledge.
(c) The linguistic expression, external or simply internal, of this mental product, different in each language.
(d) The sensible image, and therefore not formally intellectual, which accompanies the intellective process.

Three clarifications seem of utmost importance:

1) The properly intellective dimension of our conscience is made up of only the first two moments, (a) and (b), although in concreto there is never intellection without a simultaneous linguistic expression and sense perception or imaginative representation
2) Not all philosophies admit the existence of an intellective dimension specifically different from that of sense. There are many forms of sensual empiricism which confuse them and reduce the mental product to a mere linguistic expression.
3) In some systems, even in some interpretations of Thomism, an intellectual representation is interposed between the product of the mind and the aspect of reality which it makes known. According to this view, the meaning is distinguished from the referent of the product: for example, "Venus" and "morning star" would have the same referent, but different meanings. This dissociation seems contrary to realism in knowledge, because one would not come to know the thing by means of the product of the mind, but rather the immanent meaning or sense of such an operation.

General Overview (4)

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3. Implications of the acts of the mind

3.1 Structure of the intellective act in genere

To correctly determine the place of logic, it is necessary to distinguish accurately the many aspects which make up a concept in the mind. Let's first analyze an example, the enunciation "Peter is polite". This simple affirmation includes four things in one and the same act of judgment:
a) the act itself of judging that Peter is polite.
b) correlatively, the product immanent in this mental act, in this case, the proposition "Peter is polite" considered as an intelligible expression of thought.
c) the external word "Peter is polite" or at least the same internal word, considered as a linguistic expression of the intelligible proposition.
d) either the perception or if he's absent, the imagined representation of Peter and his manners.

It is extremely important to grasp the diversity of these. In particular, it should be noted that:
1) a) is not b): the act of judgment is different from the proposition as the act of construction differs from the thing constructed*.
2) b) is not c): while the linguistic expression is different in different languages ("Peter is polite", "Pierre est poli", "Pedro es civil", "Pietro e garbato", etc) the intelligible expression is identical for all men, although there is may never be, in the state of union with the body, a thought which is not made incarnate in a language.
3) b) is not d): one thing is the understanding that Peter is polite, which proceeds from the intellect, and another thing is the visual perception or memorized imagination of "Peter - polite"

* Cf I-II 90,1,2m: Sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, put aedificationem et aedificatum; it in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum contitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secundo, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio
I-II 90,1,2m
Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument.

General Overview (3)

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2.1 The "material" for logic

While the art of the architect, for example, arranges the materials of the future house with a view to its balance and beauty, the logical art has for its "material" the act itself of reason. Logic is therefore rational not only in its proceeding, like every other specifically human activity, but also in its material.

So what do we mean by "act of reason"? It is the exercise (act) of a certain faculty or potency. As a potency, reason is identical to intelligence and, at first glance, is the faculty by means of which we know the true, as opposed to the will, by which we desire the good. But the intellective potency knows by different operations.

1. When the mind discourses from known premises to conclusions yet to be known, this is called reasoning, thanks to which man grows in his knowledge. For example:

What is spiritual is incorruptible;
But the soul is spiritual;
Therefore the soul is incorruptible.

The unity of this act comes from the consequentiality which unifies the terms 'incorruptible', 'spiritual', and 'soul', as well as the conclusion to which it looks, the demonstration of the incorruptibility human soul.

2. Reasoning, while constituting an undivided whole, is nevertheless divisible into a plurality of prior acts, which all deal with some enunciations similar to those in the example above. Each one of these acts is called a judgment, and produces a proposition. To judge means to attribute on term to another, saying for example that 'the soul is spiritual', or denying one term from another, saying for example 'the soul is not material'. In the first case, the intelligence declares identical in reality the terms united in the proposition, while, in the second case, it declares separated in reality the terms divided in the proposition. The unity of the act of judging comes from the link of composition or division produced by the mind, as well as from the meaning that results. In judgment, the mind is not strictly speaking acting as reason, since it is not "discoursing further", but rather as understanding (νοῦς), that is as an intuition of signification.

3. Although judgment is a simple act of affirmation or denial, the mode in which it grasps its meanings is complex, since it implies two terms and their relation. Therefore, the proposition can be decomposed into two notions; these correspond to a certain act of the mind which conceives meaning. This act is called simple apprehension, and its product is called a concept. Simple apprehension consists in taking an aspect of reality (or perhaps some notion that is thought), for example 'soul' or 'spiritual', without affirming or denying anything in its regard. The concept is the smallest intelligible unity, which cannot be further divided. It is to be noted that the mind does not normally perform "simple apprehension" in a pure state, but usually integrates it with judgments, reasonings, or some other type of discourse (exclamations, interrogatives, etc): we don't say 'bird' or 'study', but rather 'the bird is singing' or 'study is interesting'.

From what we have now explained, we can see that logic should study the order which should be adopted in each of the three acts of the mind to discover the truth which we do not yet know. Since such discovery principally happens in reasoning, logic is interested primarily in this act and subsequently in the others, insofar as they are ordered to or otherwise related to reasoning.

General Overview (2)

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2. Explanation

2.1 The scope of logic

Logic is about proceeding "with order, easily, and without error" in reasoning. The first two qualifications refer to thought itself, whereas the last regards its relation to reality.

"With order" refers to the correct order of our thoughts, which should not follow the suggestions of imagination, but obey the demands of rigor proper to thought itself. Logic looks therefore to form valid reasonings, then to follow the due order in such reasonings. From this habitual order of our thoughts will follow an ease in dealing with more arduous intellectual problems, beginning and ending as they ought, let alone the correctness of the reasonings which lead to their solution.

But all this would be vain if our mind were to move outside of reality. In fact, what one wants to reach by exercising his reason is nothing other than the truth, which is a conformity between thought and thing: adaequatio rei et intellectus. Logic is therefore ultimately ordered to uncovering the true and therefore, correlatively, the identification of error.

Synthetically, logic is an intrument designed to order reasonings to discover the truth.

General Introduction to Logic

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I General Overview

1. Initial Description

The word 'logic' comes from the Greek 'λόγος', which means reason or (the) rational. Etymologically, that is logical which is in accord with reason, not merely in the subjective sense, but above all in the objective sense.

In current use of Western languages, the adjective 'logical' signifies what follows an intelligible coherence. Mutatis mutandis, a fact, a product, behavior, a thought, all qualify as 'logical' when these have a certain internal or external order which reason can grasp a posteriori, or of which it is even the original principle. Being essentially tied to intelligibility, the term 'logical' is said principally of thought and then, by derivation, of other realities.

But what does 'a logical thought' mean? Two connotations spring to mind: on the one hand, the rigor of thought itself in its process; on the other, its adherence to the reality of which it is a thought.

In a yet more precise sense, which alone is the interest of this course, 'logical' refers to a particular discipline of philosophical knowing, 'logic', whose mission it is to confer on thought these characteristics of order and truth. St Thomas Aquinas describes the nature of it in this way:

ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et haec ars est Logica, idest rationalis scientia. (EPA, proem., nn. 1-2)

an art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error. And this art is logic, i.e., the science of reason. (EPA, proem., nn. 1-2)

This text presents us with the scope of the "material" on which this special "art" which we call logic works. Let us unpack its meaning.

Abbreviations

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The works of Saint Thomas Aquinas are cited without the name of the author, and with the following:

I Summa theologiæ, Ia pars
I-II Summa theologiæ, Ia-IIæ
II-II Summa theologiæ, IIa-IIæ
III Summa theologiæ, IIIa pars
c. corpus articuli
lect. lectio
sol. solutio
n. numero (dell’edizione Marietti)
CG Summa contra Gentiles
EBH Expositio libri Bœtii De hebdomadibus
EBT Expositio super Bœtium De Trinitate
EE De ente et essentia
EPA Expositio libri Posteriorum [Analyticorum]
EPH Expositio libri Perihermeneias
QDA Quæstio disputata De anima
Qdl Quæstiones quodlibetales
QDP Quæstio disputata De potentia
QDV Quæstio disputata De veritate
SA Sententia libri De anima
SE Sententia libri Ethicorum
SM Sententia super Metaphysicam
Sn Scriptum super Sententiis
SPh Sententia super Physicam

Consulted Works (4)

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5. Symbolic logic

Evandro AGAZZI, La logica simbolica. IV edizione rinnovata. Brescia, Editrice La Scuola, 1990.

Joseph BOCHENSKI, Nove lezioni di logica simbolica. Bologna, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 1993.

François LEPAGE, Éléments de logique contemporaine. Montréal, Dunod éditeur - Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1991.

Consulted Works (3)

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3. Surveys
J.M. BOCHENSKI O.P., Formale Logik. Freiburg / München, Verlag Karl Alber, 1956.

Robert W. SCHMIDT S.J., The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.

4. Studies

Giuseppe BARZAGHI, L’ambiente logico della razionalità in S. Tommaso d’Aquino. Divus Thomas (Bo) 5 (2/1993), pp. 11 - 31. Ripreso in ID., L’essere, La ragione, La persuasione, [Lumen, 11], Bologna, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 1994, pp. 19 - 36.

Louis BRUNET, Le sujet de la logique selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Angelicum 58 (1981), pp. 55- 72.

Curzio CHIESA, Sémiosis - Signes - Symboles, Introduction aux théories du signe linguistique de Platon et d’Aristote. [Publications Universitaires Européennes, Série XX, vol. 340]. Berne - Berlin - New York, Peter Lang, 1991.

J.M. LE BLOND, Logique et méthode chez Aristote. Étude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique aristotélicienne. Quatrième édition. Paris, Vrin, 1996.

Marie-Dominique PHILIPPE O.P., Originalité de l’«ens rationis» dans la philosophie de saint Thomas. Angelicum 52 (1975), pp. 91 - 124.

Henri-Dominique SIMONIN O.P., La notion d’”intentio” dans l’oeuvre de S. Thomas d’Aquin. Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 19 (1930), pp. 445 - 463.

Éleuthère WINANCE O.S.B., Les propositions évidentes. Revue thomiste 72 (1972), pp. 198 - 232.

Éleuthère WINANCE O.S.B., Réflexion sur la logique de l’Aquinate, son intention, son objet, son horizon, sa nature. Revue thomiste 87 (1987), pp. 391 - 434.

Consulted Works (2)

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2. Manuals

Iosephus GREDT O.S.B., Elementa philosophiæ aristotelico-thomisticæ, vol. I, Logica / Philosophia naturalis. Ed. quinta emendata. Freiburg i. Br., Herder, 1929.

Jacques MARITAIN, Elements de philosohie, t. II, L’ordre des concepts. 1. Petite logique. Paris, Téqui, 1966.

Franciscus MORANDINI S.J., Logica. Roma, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1966.

Juan José SANGUINETTI, Logica filosofica. Firenze, Le Monnier, 1987.

Roger VERNEAUX, Introduction générale et Logique. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée. Paris, Beauchesne, 1964.

Roger VERNEAUX, Épistémologie générale ou critique de la connaissance. Nouvelle édition revue et corrigée. Paris, Beauchesne, 1959.

Consulted Works

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1. Sources

Aristotle
ARISTOTELES, Categoriæ et Liber de interpretatione. Recognovit brevique adnotatione instruxit L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford, E typographeo clarendoniano, 1949 (1989).

ARISTOTELES, Analytica priora et posteriora. Recensuit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W.D. Ross, præfatione et appendice auxit L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford, E typographeo clarendoniano, 1964 (1991).

ARISTOTELES, Topica et Sophistici Elenchi. Recensuit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W.D. Ross. Oxford, E typographeo clarendoniano, 1958.

ARISTOTELE, Opere, vol. 1: Organon: Categorie, Dell’espressione, Primi Analitici, Secondi Analitici. Trad. Di Marcello Gignante e Giorgio Colli. Bari, Laterza, 1991.

ARISTOTELE, Opere, vol. 2: Organon: Topici, Confutazioni sofistiche. Trad. di Giorgio Colli. Bari, Laterza, 1991.

PORFIRIO, Isagoge. Prefazione, introduzione, traduzione e apparati di Giuseppe Girgenti. Testo greco a fronte. Versione latina di Severino Bœzio in appendice. Milano, Rusconi, 1995.

SEVERINUS BŒTHIUS, vari commenti su Aristotele e Porfirio in Op. om., tomus posterior, Patrologia Latina, vol. 64, col. 9 - 1224.

PETRUS HISPANUS PORTUGALENSIS (PETER OF SPAIN), Tractatus called afterwards Summulæ logicales. Ed. De Rijk. Assen, Van Gorkum, 1972.

SANCTUS THOMAS AQUINAS O.P., Expositio Libri Peryermenias. Ed. leonina, t. 1*/1 (ed. altera retractata), 1989.

SANCTUS THOMAS AQUINAS O.P., Expositio Libri Posteriorum. Ed. leonina, t. 1*/2 (ed. altera retractata), 1989.

THOMAS DE VIO CARDINALIS CAIETANUS, Scripta philosophica: De nominum analogia, De conceptu entis. Ed. N. Zammit O.P. - H. Hering O.P.. Romæ, Angelicum, 1952.

IOANNES A SANCTO THOMA O.P., Cursus philosophicus thomisticus. Vol. I, Ars logica seu de forma et materia ratiocinandi. Nova editio a P. Beato Reiser O.S.B. II Reimpressio emendata. Torino, Marietti, 1948.

Outline

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Erit ergo congruus ordo addiscendi ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae...

SE 6,7,n17

Therefore, the proper order of learning is that boys first be instructed in things pertaining to logic because logic teaches the method of the whole of philosophy.
SE 6,7,n17

General Introduction to logic
I General overview
II Analytic introduction

1st part: Logic of the concept
I Placement of the concept
II The universal concept formally considered
III The universal concept materially considered
IV Explanation of the universal

2nd part: Logic of the enunciation
V Definition and division of the enunciation
VI Properties of the enunciation
VII Logic of modal enunciations

3rd part: Logic of argumentation
VIII Placement of argumentation
IX Formal logic of the syllogism
X Material logic of the syllogism
XI Induction
XII Elements of symbolic logic

Appendix: exercises

Translations of Logica

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Bonum diffusivum est sui

This blog aims to provide a translation of Fr Alain Contat's Logica in small sections.

I hope to post with some regularity. Please feel free to comment.